In March MSI suffered a major breach, and among the pilfered data was MSI’s BootGuard private key. Those issues have been fixed, but after quite a wild ride. That key should not have worked for enterprise accounts, but a bug in a Microsoft key validation allowed the consumer systems key to work for enterprise accounts. That crash dump was brought into development systems, and an engineer’s account was later accessed by Storm-0558. A crash log from 2021 unintentionally included the key, and Microsoft’s automated redaction system didn’t catch it. There was a big open question at that point, as to how exactly an outside group managed to access such a signing key. You may remember a story from a couple months ago, where Microsoft found the Chinese threat group, Storm-0558, forging authentication tokens using a stolen signing key. Since attackers have had unrestricted access to the database, they’ve been able to run offline attacks against accounts with very low iterations, and apparently that approach has been successful. Additionally, accounts created before security improvements in 2018 may have had master passwords shorter than 12 characters, and the hash iterations on those accounts may have been set distressingly low. The bulletproof security of the LastPass system depends in part on the rate limiting of authenticating with the LastPass web service. There is a pattern that has been noticed, that almost all of them had a seed phrase stored in LastPass this past November when the entire LastPass database was breached. Over $35 million has been drained from just over 150 individuals, and the list reads like a who’s-who of the least likely to fall for the normal crypto scams. Note: Please follow the steps in our documentation to enable e-mail notifications if you want to receive the related email notification for this thread.There has been a rash of cryptocurrency thefts targeting some unexpected victims. If you have extra questions about this answer, please click "Comment". If the answer is helpful, please click "Accept Answer" and kindly upvote it. Please check the above information and if there's any update, feel free to let us know. Go to the affected device->Device compliance, click each compliance policy and check if there's any error for any compliance settings.Go to Azure AD to see if the device is also compliant.Please get a screen shot of the conditional access policy details of the failed policy. find the failed policy and click it to see the detailed failed reason. Go to the sign in log and look into the "Conditional Access" tab.To troubleshoot the issue, please collect the following information to clarify: From your description, it seems condition access policy block our access. Works fine for BYOD Android I might add IF its through the Work Reeves, Thanks for posting in Q&A. My assumption is the iOS app is using an embedded Safari browser that for some reason can't play with Conditional Access, however that is a HUGE issue because out LastPass is federated/SSO. UPDATE: As a work around I've removed the Compliant Device requirement for iOS and it works without issue. To see a list of browsers that support device identification, see Access to the resource requires a compliant device. The user is using a browser that does not support device identification so the device state is unknown. Sign-in log is also void of the Device ID in this specific log, so it's as if after signing in to the phone app that is SSO'd the deny message says they must use Edge or Safari, but the users are using Safari when they get the message. Sign-In logs show the user is using a non-compliant device, however the device IS compliant.
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